It has long been wŸ believed that personal religious commitment increases with age, partly because of anxiety over death. Past evidence has lent support to this notion. However, it is alzo believed that secularization has been going on in our society, hence these correlations may reflect social change rather than increases in piety associated with aging. This paper attempts to resolve these different interpretations and reports distinct evidence for both hypotheses depending on the aspect of religious commitment examŸ
Man's ubiquitous fear of death has long been judged a mainspring of Christian commitment. From its earliest days, Christian proselytization has stressed the promise of lffe ever-lasting as the central and glorious message of the New Testament--"O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory" (I Cor. 15:55 A.V.).
Indeed, for centu¡ the major spokesmen of Christianity have deemed it unthinkable that the faith would have any relevance to the human condition without the promise of immortality. Aceording to the Apostle Paul, "II? in this lffe only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable" (I Cor. 15:19) . As one might expect, MartŸ Luther expressed these sentiments in earthier language, "If you believe in no future life, I would not give a mushroom for your God."l * A revision of a paper read at the annual meetings of the American Catholic Sociological Association, 1966. This is a publication from the Program in Religion and Society of the Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley and is identified as A-65 in the Center's reprint series.
1 Quoted in Radoslav A. Tsanoff, The ProbMore reeently, Harry Emerson Fosdick wrote that "The goodness of God is plainly at stake when one discusses immortality, for ir death ends all, the Creator is building men like sand houses on the shore, caring not a whit that the fateful waves will quite obliterate them. ''2 In this he echoed Tennyson's line, "If immortality be not true, then no God but a mocking fiend created us .,,3
This centrality of the "victory over death" in Christian teaching is connected with a basic tenet of conventional wisdom: Men get more pious as they get older and begin to fear the imminence of their death. "Beads and prayer-books ate the toys of age" wrote Alexander Pope in An Essay on Man. Of course, as is always the case with conventional wisdom, there is an opposing minority view that it is the young, not the old, who fear death most. Indeed, as George Herbert put it, "Old men go to death; death comes to young men. "4 Still, the stereotype of piety in old age seems very credible, and is continually reinforced by anecdotes of death-bed conversions.
In this paper I shall take up the question of whether or not people do become increasingly committed to religion as they get older.
Past research has provided a smattering of data on the relationship between age and piety. Studies by Fichter, 5 Gorer, 6 Cauter and Downham, 7 and Glock, Ringer and Babbie, 8 have shown that weekly church attendance is slightly higher among older people than younger people. In addition Gorer found slight dŸ in belief in life after death between older and younger persons. 9 However, all of these findings are subject to a major problem of interpretation. Each is based on differences between younger and older persons at a single point in time. None charted ehanges in the same persons over time. Consequently, we cannot say whether these differences represent changes over age or whether they show instead that 4 Jacula Prudentum, 1651. Italic added. 5 Joseph H. Fiehter, "The Profile of Catholic ReligiousLife," American Journal o~ Sociology, 58 (July, 1952 ), pp. 145-49. 6 Geoffrey Gorer, Exploring EngIish Character, London: Cresset, 1955 o Op. cit. In addition, Cavan and his associates found slight inereases in the proportion believing in lffe after death as age inereased in a study, however, restrieted to persons over 60. For lack of denominational controls, and because of the small and somewhat inconsistent difference, ir is diflicult to say what, ff anything, these data mean. R. S. Cavan, et al., Personal Adjustment in Old Age, Chieago: Scienee Researeh Assoeiates, 1949. recent generations are simply less religious than earlier ones. This is a most vexing difl~culty. If there is strong reason to predict increases in religious commitment as persons age, there are equaUy persuasive reasons to expect that secularization has been occurring in modern society and thus that the young will be less religious.
A second inadequacy of previous research is that the data have been exceedingly skimpy--handicapped by poor samples and few indicators of religious commitment; indeed nearly all of these findings are based on nothing more than church attendance. But, as much recent research has shown, religious commitment is a complex phenomenon requiring a variety of measurements. Thus, at present we really know very little about the empiricaI relationship between age and faith.
In what follows I shall examine this relationship and attempt to resolve the question of whether differenees are attributable to aging or to ehanges in the religious commitment of society reflected in lower religiousness among the younger generations.
The data were colleeted from a random sample of the church-member population of four West Coast counties centered on San Francisco. AH Protestant and Catholie congregations in the four counties were ineluded in the sampling frame. Congregations were selected randomly, each having the number of chances for selection equal to its total membership. After drawing congregations, random samples of members were drawn from the ehurch rolls. Each respondent selected was sent a lengthy mail questionnaire---approximately 500 items were included--and 73 per cent of the Protestants and 54 per cent of the Roman Catholies returned completed documents.
Telephone interviews were conducted The argument that secularization is taking place in America depends upon evidence that the young are less likely to hold the traditional tenets of Chrisflan orthodoxy than are the old. But it is also suposed that persons become more likely to hold these beliefs as they get older. Yet, these are not in fact exaetly similar predictions, and the pattern of the data in Table i seems to permit the hypothesis of secularization, but not that of increasing orthodoxy with age.
If orthodoxy increased with age we would expect this to be a systematically cumulative process. Thus, we would expect some persons to respond to this process in their forties, to be joined by more persons during their fifties, and :o Full details in sampling and data collection are reported in Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Belie# and Anti-Semitism, New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 11 Four items were scored to create the Orthodoxy Index. These measured tima belief in a personal God, in the divinity of Jesus Christ, in the authenticity of Biblical miracles, and in the existence of the Devil. Respondents received one point for each of these in whieh they believed without doubt. Respondents who expressed doubt or disbelief on ah Ÿ were scored zero. Persons who failed to answer any of the four were not scored. The initial index thus ranged from a high of four through a low of zero. As used here "high" indicates a score of three or four on the index. A full account of eonstruction and validation of the index may be found in Rodney Stark and Charles Y. Glock, American Piety, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Calffomia Press, 1968, Ch. 3. more again in their sixties and so on, so that each older group would show a higher proportion of believers than would the next younger group. However, a secularization hypothesis need not assume such cumulative changes. A major change could have occurred at some point in recent history and all the subsequent generations show this new lower level of piety without becoming successively less pious. Furthermore, age changes should operate in all Chrisfian groups, Protestants as well as Catholics, and among liberal Protestants as well as moderate and conservative ones. But the data shown in Table 1 indicate that there seem to be no meaningful differences with age among the liberal Protestants or among the Roman Catholics. We shall return to this point in a moment. Furthermore, age differences among moderate and conservative Protestants are not the cumulative increases over age required by a theory of belief increasing as people get older. Instead, the only meaningful shŸ in orthodoxy with age occurs between the 40-yearolds and the 50-year-olds in both the moderate and conservative Protestant groups. Above 50 there are no meaningfui increases, nor are there any meaningful decreases below 40. This shift is marked by a broken line in the table.
What can we conclude from this? It seems more than coincidental that the age at which fewer persons adhere to traditional religious beliefs occurs precisely at the age that separates the preWorld War II generations from the post-war generations. Persons who were from 40 to 49 in 1963, at the time these data were collected, were flora 17 to 26 at the time the war broke out. It is these people, and those born after them, who have been most shaped by the emergence of an America of mobile eitydwellers, inhabiting a fast, technical, mass society. World War II was a water- The data strongly suggest that in this newer America traditional Christian orthodoxy is less powerful. But why do there seem to be no similar shffts among the liberal Protestants and the Roman Catholics? While it appears in the tableas if the liberal Protestants have been unaffected by recent social changes, this is in partan artifaet produced because there are very few orthodox believers of any age in these denominations. Consequently, ordy very small differences in the proportions of highly orthodox persons between the pre-war and post-war generations could have occurred. However, ff we examine instead the proportions who scored zero or one on Orthodoxy, and thus were the least possible orthodox believers, we find that slightly more than hall? (52%) of those from post-war generations received sueh scores, whfle only 40 per cent of those in pre-war generations did so. Thus, the younger generations show an increased tendency to reject traditional orthodoxy in the liberal denominations too.
The resistance of Roman Catholics to the post-war changes in religious perspectives may be based on the fact that the new urban America is not so new for the Catholics. They have historically been city-dwellers in this country and the great changes of recent decades only seem to be extreme when viewed from the perspective of an earlier agrarian America, not when viewed from the city. For the cities haven't changed so mueh, it is rather that Protestants have moved to town. Thus, Catholicism perhaps long ago made an adjustment to maintaining faith in urban society, however, it may also be that the younger Catholics have undergone changes in their religious perspective which are simply not reflected by the tenets making up this measure of orthodoxy.
Fortunately, data are avai/able to pursue this possible explanation. As can be seen in Table 2 , the younger generations of Catholics do show a drop in commitment to several specifically Catholic beliefs. The first of these, shown in the upper half of the table, asks about the relevance of practicing artificial birth control for gaining salvation. While roughly 20 per cent of those Catholics under 50 think this would "definitely prevent" salvation, 38 per cent of those over 50 think this is the case. Above 50 there are no differences among the age groups, below 50 there are no significant differences either. These data precisely match the pre-war/post-war shifts seen among Protestants in Table 1 . The second specifically Catholic belief shown concerns the infallibility of the Pope in matters of faith and morals. Here again the major shift in the proportions who think it "completely true" that the Pope is infallible is between the pre-war and post-war generations. Ignoring data on those under 20 years of age, because the percentage is based upon too few cases to be trustworthy, there are no differences in the proportion accepting Papal irffallibility among the post-war generations. Above the broken line, however, a slight increase from one age group to the next is suggested. However, the main effect seems to be a slight shift away from this belief by the younger generation.
These data show that Catholicism has not been Ÿ to the secularizing forces of the new America. However, the impact so far seems to have been confined to tenets which are exclusively Catholic--beliefs which separate Rome from the rest of Christianitymwhile the universal tenets of Christianity seem so lar unaffected among Roman Catholics. These, and all other relationships reported in this section, proved to be independent of sex or social class.
Thus, we have seen that commitment to Christian orthodoxy does not appear to be related to the process of getting old. However, belief in lffe after death is not one of the four basic beliefs making up the Orthodoxy Index. These four are belief in God, in the Divinity of Jesus, in the authenticity of Biblical miracles, and in the existence of the Devil. 12 Even though unwavering commitment to these tenets does not seem related to aging, it could be the case that belief in immortality, because of its special relevance for the elderly, does in fact increase systematically with age. And surprising as this may seem, Table  3 elearly shows that this is in fact the case among Protestants. For example, while only 38 per cent of the liberal Protestants who are less than 20 years old felt that the existence of life after death was "completely true," this proportion rises to 51 per cent among those in their fifties and on up to 70 per cent of those 70 and over. (The several small reversals are probably only random fluctuations. )
Among moderate Protestants these proportions increase from 56 per cent of those less than 20, to 75 per cent of those in their fifties, and 88 per cent of those AGE AND FAITI-I 70 and over. Belief in life after death also increases with age among conservatire Protestants, however, here the extraordinarily large proportions at all age levels who believe in immortality make it impossible for very large differences to obtain.
The pattern among Roman Catholics is not altogether clear. For Catholics the data suggest that belief is high among the very young and slowly falls, perhaps as younger adults shrug off their childhood training, and then begins to increase again at about age 50.
In any event it is clear that although commitment to Christian orthodoxy in general does not increase as people age, belief in survival beyond the grave does increase among Protestants. What are we to make of this? James B. Pratt anticipated such an empirical finding in his theoretical study of the psychology of religion published in 1928.13 He wrote that:
As Be that as it may, further examination of many other responses to questions on belief contained in the data revealed none on which there were eumulative increases with age. Thus, it is necessary to conelude that changes in the religious perspective of American society are revealed by comparisons between church members of different ages, but that people do not get more orthodox or conservative in their religious beliefs as they get older, except that they do increasingly become certain of the existence of life beyond death. In general, then, people do not get more pious with age, insofar as piety means belief in God, the divinity of Jesus, and similar bedrocks of Christian theology. There is, of course, nothing in these tenets that is more relevant to the aged than to the young. However, where Christian belief does assume special relevance for the existential anxieties of aging, in its doctrine of victory over death, the aging process does seem to produce increased belief.
RITUAL PAI~TICIPATION 16 AND PIRIVATE DEVOTIONALISM 17
If the aged do not express increasing piety in terms of adherente to the theol-15 The Illusion of Immortality, New York: Philosophical Library, 1934 -1959 10 The Index of Ritual Involvernent consists of answers to two questions: 1) the frequency of church attendance and 2) the frequency of saying table grace. Persons who both attended church every, of nearly every, week and who said grace at least once a week ogy of Christianity (aside from immortality), perhaps they do show increasing engrossment in the ritualistic and devotional aspects of religious commitment. Table 4 allows a test of this hypothesis.
The relationship between age and public ritual participation, as shown in were classified as high on the index. Persons who did either this frequently were scored as medium. Persons who did neither this often were scored as low. A full account of index constnmtion and validation can be found in Stark and Glock, op. cit., Ch. 4. 17 The Index of Private Devotionalism was based on the frequency of private prayer and the importance the individual placed upon private prayer. Scored high were those who said prayer was "extremely" important and who pray p¡ at least once a week. Those scored medium met one of these criteria. Those scored low met neither. A full account of index construction and validation can be found in Stark and Glock, op. cit., Ch. 5. the upper hall of the table, seems very slight. Among Protestants ir appears that persons 70 and over are more inclined to ritual commitment than those below 70. However, there are no interpretable differences among the below 70 age groups, except for the possibflity that persons under 20 are a bit less likely to be ritually involved than are those over 20. This difference is uncertain, however, because of the small number of cases on which the percentages are based.
Among Roman Catholics, aside from the possibility that those under 20 are less likely to be ritually involved than the rest, there appears to be no interpretable relationship between age and ritual involvement.
This lack of any important connection between age and ritual involvement may stem from the fact that although (89) 44 (227) 39 (231) 39 (129) 41 (66) 36 (25) 70 (10) 0 63 (95) 53 (191) 51 (218) 66 (116) 65 (63) 59 (34) 79 (14) 83 (83) 89 (100) 89 (84) 91 (58) 96 (28) 100 (12) 78 (9) 0 62 (84) 60 (127) 48 (99) 60 (63) 60 (30) 50 (10)0 o Too few cases for stable percentages, presented for descriptive interest only.
older persons do get more engrossed in religion, the difficulties of attending worship services because of ill-health and disability work against any increase in their attendance. However, this would not apply to saying table prayers, or grace, and this item, which is included in the index, shows no connection with age either.
Nevertheless, looking at private devotionalism, shown in the lower half of the table, it is apparent that this aspect of religious commitment increases greatly with age. Among liberal Protestants, while 34 per cent of those in their twenties scored high on private devotionalism, 48 per cent of those in their fifties, and 68 per cent of those 70 and over did so. Among moderate Protestants these same proportions are 35%, 58%, and 81%, and among conservative Protestants 62%, 88% and 96%. A similar increase can be seen among Roman Catholics, from just more than half scoring high in the younger age groups on up to about three-fourths scoring high in the older groups.
The systematic way in which these proportions increase, while not precluding an explanation based on social change, strongly suggests that it is aging that accounts for them.
Thus, the effect of age seems to be not The elderly do not shift their image of God from a "higher force" to a kindly man with a white beard, but they begin praying a good deal more to whatever conception of God they do hold.
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 18
How does aging effect the propensity to have religious experiences? The data shown in Table 5 indicate that the tendency to have religious experiences does not increase with age except among the conservative Protestant groups. Indeed, there is some suggestion in the data that in the other Protestant bodies and among Roman Catholics younger persons might be slightly more prone to such experiences than the older. Because of small case bases in the under 20 group, this suggestion must be taken 18 Three items constitute the Religious Experience Index: "A sense of being saved in Christ," "A feeling that you were somehow in the presence of God," and "A feeling of being punished by God for something you had done." Those scored high on the index at least thoug' they had experienced all three. Those sco medium thought they might have had or two of these experiences. Those scorer were certain they had not had any (' experiences. A full account of index tion and validation can be found in with caution, stilI it is also supported by contrasts between persons in their twenties and those in their thirties, where the case bases are quite large. It may be that in the moderate and liberal Protestant bodies where the churches do not formally attempt to produce such experiences that they are mainly associated with the impressionability of youth --a suggestibility and naivete that is outgrown (albeit some would wish to call it an innocence that is lost).
However, among conservative Protestants, whose churches maintain organized social situations aimed at producing such religious encounters, the proportions who "succeed" in fulfilling this expectation rise with age. While 79 per cent of those under 20, and 83 per cent of those in their twenties scored high on the Index of Religious Experience, 96 per cent of those in their sixties, and 100 per cent of those 70 and over, scored high.
Thus, the effect of age on religious experience depends on the nature of the religious expectations of the denomination to which one belongs. Where religious experiences are fostered in situations created by the churches, the propensity for this forro of commitment increases with age. Where it is not greatly or formally encouraged, it seems to occur more commonly among the very young.
Finally, an examination of the relationship between age and religious knowledge revealed no patterns to indicate either social change ora connection with aging.
These data force the conclusion that the primary outlet provided by religion for the anxieties and deprivations of old age is in personal devotional activities--that is, the increasing piety of the elderly is manffested through prayer. While church members seemingly are more likely to believe in the doctrine of immortality as they get older, in no other way does their theological outlook change of become more conservative. Nor ate the aging more likely to undergo religious expe¡ (indeed, the opposite may be the case), nor to take part in ritual activities, nor to be more informed about religion.
Thus, the widespread notion that men become increasingly pious as a means to overcome the ravages of time is true only ii? piety is carefully defined as private devotionalism and belief in an immortal soul. It is not true ii? the word piety is used as a synonym for religious commitment in its other aspects.
